Abstract-We give a proof of a theorem on the common divisibility of polynomials and permuted polynomials (over GF (2)) by a polynomial ( ).
g i x i + x m be a fixed polynomial over GF (2) and let An(g) be the set of polynomials a(x) = n01 i=0 a i x i of formal degree n 0 1 over GF (2) that are divisible by g(x). 
In [1] , a theorem (which generalizes [2] , [3] ) is given without proof, that characterizes those permutations such that a (x) 2 An(g) for all a(x) 2 A n (g). In this correspondence, we give a proof of this statement.
II. PERMUTATIONS AND DIVISIBILITY
For any g(x) with a nonzero constant term, it is well known that there exists some N 0 (g) (= N 0 ), such that g(x) divides x N 01 if and only if N is a multiple of N 0 . Let us first assume that n is a multiple of N0: n = MN0. We associate to any a(x) of formal degree n 0 1, Obviously, one has a(x) = b(x N ; x). Proof: x i + x j (resp., x (i) + x (j) ) is divisible by g(x) if and only if i j (resp., (i) (j)) mod Lemma 3: Any such preserves A n (g):
Proof: Check that such a does not modify b(1; x) and apply
The set of all those is a group (denoted by S).
Let : j 7 ! (j) be an arbitrary permutation of f0; . . . ; N 0 0 1g
and let it permute the coefficients b j (y) of b(y; z):
Denote by a(x) 7 ! a (x) the permutation of the coefficients of a(x) = b(x N ; x) induced by this , and by Aut (g; N 0 ) the automorphism (permutation) group of the binary cyclic code C of length N0 generated by g(x).
Lemma 4: Any such preserves A n (g) if and only if it is an element of Aut (g; N 0 ).
Proof: By definition, if = 2 Aut (g; N0), there exists a polynomial a(x) of degree N 0 0 1 that is a multiple of g(x) while a (x) is not a multiple of g(x). Conversely, any 2 Aut (g; N 0 ) preserves the divisibility of b(1; x) by g(x). Then apply Lemma 1.
In the sequel, the group Aut (g; N 0 ) is denoted by R.
As an easy consequence, one obtains the following theorem. 
III. APPLICATION TO TURBO CODES
Theorem 5 and Corollary 6 characterize which turbo code interleavers are spontaneously "self-terminating," (see also [6] ). Some of them seem to be very good [5] but it is not yet clear whether this self-terminating property does imply some loss in the performances at high signal-to-noise ratio.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this correspondence, we consider the security of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem [1] . In this system, the public key is a generator matrix of a linear code. The encryption consists in choosing a codeword in this code to which an error vector of a given weight is added. The decryption is the decoding of these errors. The trap is the knowledge of a decoder for the public code. The security of the cryptosystem lies in the following two assumptions:
• the parameters of the public code are large enough to avoid decoding by a general purpose decoder;
• it is difficult to build a fast (polynomial-time) decoder from the knowledge of the public code alone.
The issues regarding the first assumption were investigated at length in [2] - [4] . Here we deal with attacks related to the second assumption.
In the original construction of the McEliece system, the secret code 0 is picked in a family of binary Goppa codes of length n = 2 m and error-correcting capability t where m = 10 and t = 50. The public code is obtained by permuting the coordinates of 0.
The support splitting algorithm [5] allows the computation of the permutation between two equivalent binary linear codes. Hence, this algorithm can be used to derive an attack by enumerating all the Goppa codes with suitable parameters. Because of the huge number of Goppa codes, this attack remains unrealistic (for McEliece parameters it can be roughly estimated at 10 130 years on a workstation). However, subfamilies of Goppa codes can be recognized-the weak keys-thanks to their particular structure. Namely, by applying the support splitting algorithm to Goppa codes with a binary generator polynomial one detects their nontrivial automorphism group. This allows an attack by enumerating the Goppa codes with such a property. Once again, this attack remains unfeasible since it would require an unreasonable computation time (about 10 5 years on a workstation). Still, there is a way to greatly reduce its complexity by constructing the much shorter (length about n=m) projected idempotent subcode. We present a nontrivial lower bound for this subcode. From this bound we deduce the nontriviality of the code whenever the generator polynomial is binary. Finally, we show how to modify the attack by using the properties of the projected idempotent subcode. With half size parameters (m = 9, t = 28) our implementation of the attack ran 15 min on a standard workstation. For 
